The health of banks and thrifts by Michael C. Keeley
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
February 21, 1986
The Health of Banks and Thrifts
The many recent reports in the financial press
about bank and thrift failures raise doubts about
the health of the industry. In 1985, approx-
imately 120 banks failed - the largest number
since the Great Depression, and several large
thrifts also have failed recently. Moreover, some
analysts report that the net worth of the thrift
industry as well as the reserves of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLlC)
are dangerously low.
As this bad news has been appearing, the overall
stock prices of large publicly traded banks and
thrifts have been performing remarkably well.
This Letter assesses what this good stock market
performance implies for the health ofthese
institutions and the stability of the financial sys-
tem as a whole.
The role of capital
Capital plays a key role in insulating depositors
(and other liability holders) from variations in
the return on depositories' assets. The larger the
portion of assets funded with capital, the larger
the range of returns on assets that are consistent
with meeting obligations on liabilities. When the
return on assets is insufficient to make the prom-
ised payments on deposits and debt, cash flow is
negative; and if the situation persists, insolvency
follows.
With our current system of deposit insurance,
the wealth of insured depositors may not be
affected. However, the insurance funds can suf-
fer losses. Thus, the level and variance in the
return on assets and the proportion of assets
funded with capital are important determinants
of the extent of such losses. All other things
equal, a depository industry with more capital
relative to assets will experience fewer failures,
will be more stable, and will be less likely to
threaten the insurance funds.
Sources of current problems
The unstable economy ofthe 1970s and early
1980s, with fluctuating inflation and interest
rates, appears to have caused many problems for
banks and thrifts. Variable inflation and interest
rates most obviously have caused problems for
thrifts. In the aggregate, thrifts suffered severe
losses during 1981 and 1982 as interest rates
rose to record levels. The rise in interest rates
also greatly reduced the market value of thrifts'
assets while changing little the value of their lia-
bilities. Some even argue that the thrift industry's
net worth virtually wa~ destroyed in this epi-
sode.
Less obviously, unanticipated changes in the
rate of inflation appear to have caused large
changes in the relative prices of some assets.
Real estate and farm land are examples of assets
whose (real) values skyrocketed with inflation
and fell with a return to more stable prices,
creating problems for banks and thrifts with
large exposures in these areas.
To assess how much the episodes of the late
1970s and early 1980s weakened publicly
traded banks and thrifts, and whether these
institutions' prospects have significantly
improved since then, I next present evidence on
how their capital has behaved.
Measuring capital
There are two approaches to measuring capital.
One relies on book (accounting) values of tangi-
ble assets and liabilities, and the other uses stock
price data. These approaches, however, some-
times lead to quite different conclusions about
financial health.
Book-value net worth can be calculated easily
for virtually all institutions, but when asset
values change radically (because, for example,
of changing interest rates or probabilities of
default), historical book values of long-term
assets bear little relation to their current market
values. Thus, book-value measures of net worth
can be very misleading.
For a depository whose stock is traded, the mar-
ket value of that stock (price per share times the
number of shares) represents the market value of
the firm. This value includes not only financialFRBSF
capital, but "goodwill", the value of the charter
(created by regulatory restrictions on entry) and
the value ofthe implicit guarantee of deposit
insurance. To the extent that deposit insurance is
subsidized, its implicit value could be an impor-
tant componentof the aggregate capital of
depository institutions.
The value of the deposit insurance guarantee
increases as other components of capital decline
or as the variability of return on assets increases.
Thus, a rise in the marketvalue of a depository's
financial assets may not be fully reflected in its
stock price. In addition, the value ofthe insur-
ance guarantee varies directly with changes in
the effective coverage of an institution's lia-
bilities as well as the willingness of regulatory
agencies to let institutions continue to operate
with negative net worth. Thus, in interpreting a
change in stock prices, it is important to dis-
tinguish between changes in financial net worth
and changes in the insurance guarantee.
Evidence on market values
Although relatively few banks' and thrifts' stocks
are publicly traded, stock prices are available for
the holding companies of the largest institutions.
The charts depict market and book values of
capital-to-asset ratios for a group of 57 banks
and 14 S&Ls. The assets of the 57 banks con-
stitute approximately 55 percent oftotal bank
assets. The 14 S&Ls' assets are about 10 percent
of all FSLlC-insured institutions' assets.
In Chart 1, a market-based measure of aggregate
capital to assets is plotted along with a book-
value measure for the group of 57 banks. (The
market-based measure is equal to the market
value of capital divided by the market value of
capital plus the book value of liabilities, which
equals the market value of assets assuming the
market and book values of liabilities are equal).
The chart shows that this group of banks' mar-
ket-value capital-to-asset ratios declined from a
high in 1976 of almost 6 percent to a trough of
about 3 percent in mid-1982 even though book
values varied little. This decline in market value
is consistent with widespread concerns that the
financial system was becoming increasingly
fragile. Since the trough in mid-1982, market-
value capital-to-asset ratios have improved con-
siderably, reaching approximately 4.5 percent.
If the rise in the market value of capital since
1982 is due to an increase in the market's valua-
tion of banks' assets (and not an increase in the
value of the insurance guarantee) and if the
return on banks' assets has not become riskier,
this increase in capital means that this group of
banks is now much better able to weather future
financial storms than it was three years ago.
Although some might argue that the rescue of
Continental Illinois Bank in mid-1984 repre-
sented an effective increase in insurance
coverage (which would also lead to an increase
in observed market values), Frederick Furlong
(this Letter, August 31, 1984) has presented evi-
dence that the episode did not alter market per-
ceptions ofthe degree of insurance coverage.
Even ifthere were an implicit increase in insur-
ance coverage in 1984, it would have been fully
reflected in market values then and would not
explain subsequent changes in market values. In
addition, in an analysis of the variation of banks'
stock prices compared to the market as a whole,
Jack Beebe (this Letter, July 17, 1985) found no
evidence that the underlying risk on banks'
assets has increased. Thus, it appears that pub-
licly traded banks are much healthier than they
were three years ago.
Whether the current 4.5 percent level of (mar-
ket-value) capital is "adequate" is an open ques-
tion, however, especially since it is still below
the 5.75 percent level of late 1977. The
improved capital position of these banks since
1982 certainly does not mean that banks' prob-
lems are over. Increases in the industry's aggre-
gate capital improves its likelihood of surviving
future shocks, but it does not mean that individ-
ual failures will not continue.
Failures depend on the capital level of individual
institutions. Although the percentage of banks
with less than 2 percent (market value) capital in
my sample has declined from over 10 percent in
mid-1982 to about 5 percent currently, it is still
1.5 percentage points higher than it was in late
1977. Moreover, some smaller, non-publicly
traded banks, such as agricultural banks, have
much different portfolios and likely have not
experienced the same sort of increases in market
value capital as large publicly traded banks.
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Conclusions
The stability of the depository industry as a
whole depends on its overall level of capital rel-
ative to assets for any given level of risk. An
industry with very little capital is unlikely to sur-
vive even a mild financial shock. By mid-1982,
the market value of capital of publicly traded
thrifts and, to a lesser extent, banks had dropped
to levels that raised questions about the strength
ofthe financial system.
The evidence in this Lettersuggests that, unlike
the impression one might gain from a casual
reading ofthe financial press, the news on banks
and thrifts is not all bad. The system as a whole
seems much less fragile than it was three years
ago.
Since mid-1982, market-based capital-to-asset
ratios ofthis group of banks and thrifts have
increased, both absolutely and relative to book-
value measures. Moreover, the percentage of
publicly traded institutions with very low capi-
tal-to-asset ratios based on market valuations has
declined substantially. However, because mar-
ket value capital-to-asset ratios have not yet
returned to the levels of the late 1970s, one
might legitimately question whether current cap-
itallevels are in any sense "adequate".
Michael C. Keeley, Senior Economist
There still remains the question ofwhat level of
thrift capital is adequate. Statistical evidence
(not presented) indicates that thrifts' (market)
capital values have been highly variable over
the past few years compared to stock prices in
general and the capital of banks. This suggests
that risk associated with the return on thrifts'
assets exceeds banks' by a wide margin. Thus,
unless the variability of interest rates has
declined (which some analysts claim), the cur-
rent 5 percent capital-to-asset ratio for these
thrifts offers less protection for liability holders
and the insurance fund than would the same
ratio for banks.
cial capital. Indeed, as several analysts have
argued, some "insolvent" thrifts are still operat-
ing. However, the percentage of thrifts in my
sample with less than 2 percent capital (based
on market value) has declined from almost 80
percent in mid-1982 (and 65 percent in late
1984) to approximately 7 percent now.
* Market Value capital-to-asset ratio is equal to market value
of capital divided by market value of capital plus book
value of liabilities.
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An increase in thrifts' overall capital, however,
does not imply that all thrifts have positive finan-
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Unlike banks, statistical evidence (not presented)
shows that S&Ls' market capital values move
very strongly in an inverse relationship to long-
term interest rates. (This might be expected since
S&Ls' primary asset consists of long-term mort-
gages.) Thus, the increase in S&Ls' capital since
early 1984 has been due in large part to declin-
ing interest rates. Currently, these S&Ls' market-
based capital-to-asset ratios have risen to about
5 percent. While this suggests a much improved
position since mid-1982, capital-to-asset ratios
are still far belowtheir levels of late 1979.
Chart 2 depicts a similar plot for 14 S&Ls for
December 1979 through January 1986. Even
more so than the banks, these S&Ls' capital was
severely depleted by mid-1982, with aggregate
market-value capital-to-asset ratios falling from 7
percent in late 1979 to 2 percent in mid-1982.
hold over 50 percent of all bank assets, and their
improved health as a group bodes well for the
health of the banking industry as a whole.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 200,632 - 8 13,060 6.9
Loans and Leases1 6 181,314 43 11,804 6.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,071 - 70 - 5 0.0
Real estate 65,985 78 3,777 6.0
Loans to Individuals 38,757 234 6,226 19.1
Leases 5,698 6 421 7.9
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities 10,805 - 33 - 274 - 2.4
Other Securities2 8,513 - 18 1,528 21.8
Total Deposits 197,202 -4,077 4,691 2.4
Demand Deposits 45,424 -3,410 1,336 3.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 31,571 571 3,140 11.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,459 - 345 2,009 16.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,319 - 323 1,347 .9
Money MarketDeposit
Accounts-Total 45,619 - 256 2,231 5.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 38,047 10 - 1,503 - 3.8
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 25,816 - 897 5,167 25.0
Two WeekAverages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)JDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











, Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes u.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change